CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call to order the 560th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may make a statement on any other matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mongolia. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The present session of the Conference on Disarmament is being held at a turning-point in world development. These are not just idle words but a momentous reality. The world is undergoing headlong change, in a way that can truly be called revolutionary. Today, more happens in one year than formerly in decades, and more in one month than in years. Before our very eyes, walls are collapsing, seemingly inviolable lines of confrontation are eroding, new States are emerging and the political map of the world is changing - as a result not of wars, as in the past, but of peaceful, democratic development. These changes are affecting not only Europe but also other regions of the world, where the ideas of democracy, freedom, justice and equal rights are asserting themselves, although not without difficulties, sometimes major difficulties.

Profound changes are also taking place in the Soviet Union. Our perestroika, which began five years ago, has assumed an irreversible character. At the same time, it has revealed such fundamental contradictions in society, accumulated over decades, that all of its structures, both horizontal and vertical, have begun to experience tremendous strains. It is now obvious that these structures cannot be left untouched since they have become a hindrance to the renewal of society and are undermining the foundations of its progress and stability.

The complexity of the problems that we have to solve at home is not making us want to fence ourselves off from the rest of the world. One of the imperatives of perestroika is to overcome the psychology of autarky, of self-isolation and exclusiveness, and to create an open society.

The changes taking place in the world and in our country are of an objective nature and historically conditioned. No one can halt them or slow them down. But any change also has a potential for instability. That is why we are seeking to find the optimum combination of renewal and stability. Stability is not synonymous with ossification of old structures. What has outlived its time must be sent to the scrap-heap of history, but in a way that does not harm the emergence of the new. In this context, now more than ever, what is needed in relations between States are confidence and mutual respect,

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and, in politics, a transition from passive mutual understanding to active interaction and businesslike partnership with a view to maintaining dynamic stability under rapidly changing conditions.

Another important reason for ensuring stability is that the world today still carries the burden of over-armament characterized by huge arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. Our country, too, has accumulated a large amount of weapons. We are fully conscious of the responsibility that this imposes upon us. For a whole series of domestic reasons and foreign-policy considerations, the Soviet Union is now no less interested than other States - possibly even more so - in the steady advancement of the arms control and disarmament process. However, disarmament is, of course, not an end in itself but only one of the means for building the secure, democratic and civilized world which we need and part of which we wish to be. But without disarmament it is impossible to create a new world order and new security structures.

Never during the entire post-war period has the possibility of a drastic weakening of the levers of military force in world politics been so close as today. A general consensus has already developed that the threat of war has receded into the past and that a unique chance is appearing of building a qualitatively new world, based on normal, civilized relations between States and groups of States. The prospects that have emerged at the Vienna and Geneva negotiations are opening up the possibility of the progressive dismantling of the security model which developed in the years of the "cold war" and which was based primarily on military confrontation. As we understand it, our Western negotiating partners are proceeding, in principle, on the same assumption.

If in the near future - this very year, we hope - we succeed as a result of negotiations in arriving at agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in the nuclear potentials of the USSR and the United States, and on removing the potential for surprise attack from the arsenals of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO conventional armed forces, that will radically improve the entire situation on the European continent and in the world as a whole, have a multi-dimensional constructive effect on East-West relations and be a sign that the post-war period of confrontation is over. Evidently, it will then be possible to speak of the irreversibility of a fundamental improvement in the world situation, a decisive turning-point in the matter of disarmament, and the beginning of a real shift from over-armament to reasonable sufficiency for defence.

The Vienna talks are undoubtedly of special importance for European security and stability. Assessment of the present state of affairs in Vienna makes it possible to identify a high degree of agreement among the 23 participants on a number of questions of principle, including those relating to the conceptual approach to the structure of the initial understanding. At the same time, there are still many questions of substance to be settled, not to mention a multitude of technical details. We are concerned that in the 35-party negotiations agreement has not yet been reached on a new generation of confidence-building measures that would include, in

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particular, activities of naval and air forces, although some progress is being seen on other elements of the subject-matter of those negotiations. Nevertheless, the Vienna talks have entered their decisive and, we hope, final stage. At this stage of the work, it becomes particularly important to take fully into account both collective interests and the interests and concerns of each State. The situation would prove difficult to redress if, at this stage of the negotiations, emotions prevailed over common sense and the conclusion of an all-important treaty were frustrated or indefinitely postponed.

It must be clearly realized that delay in Vienna in finding solutions to the remaining problems - and they could be enumerated: personnel, aviation, definitions of the main categories of arms, regional division, verification and elimination procedures - may have a braking effect on the entire all-European process, especially as the Vienna treaty is one of the key items of the all-European summit meeting to be held at the end of the year.

It is now becoming increasingly clear: the political situation in Europe is developing so quickly that it is already beginning to outdistance the disarmament process.

Of course, it is the German question that now constitutes the crux of European security and stability. Today, no one can have any doubt that Germany will become an important component of united Europe, making a major contribution to the construction of the common European home and the single all-European spaces - economic, ecological, legal and humanitarian. Moreover, in the circumstances that have arisen the process of Germany's unification can and must become a stimulus - and the new united German State, an engine - of profound qualitative changes in Europe organized on the principles of joint security, confidence and good-neighbourliness.

But there is something else that is true. A united Germany will not fit into the landscape of a new Europe if, in Europe, everything remains as before. In such a case, German unity could upset the balance of forces established over the previous decades and lead to an aggravation of contradictions. We consider the isolation of Germany undesirable, and we are in favour of joint efforts aimed at creating dependable structures of peace.

The leaders of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty declared, at a meeting of their Political Consultative Committee, that the organization would have to undergo very profound changes if it wished to play a constructive role in the further development and improvement of the European structures of co-operation and security. Our alliance has embarked on the path of radical transformation of its activities in all fields, including the military field. We have proposed to the NATO States that they should start moving in a similar direction, and we note with satisfaction that we have heard a positive response from Turnberry. As we begin this movement, we must bear in mind that not only is its direction important, but even more so are the dynamics and the magnitude of the accompanying changes. In this connection, we are looking forward with great attention to the decisions of NATO's London session.

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As new joint security structures are moulded in the continent and the world as a whole, nuclear arms too must be looked at anew. We put forward the ideal of a nuclear-free world, and we remain true to it. But we recognize that we are not living in an ideal world. The huge arsenals of nuclear weapons have become so firmly established in security systems that the idea of eliminating them at a stroke is unrealistic. Nuclear disarmament is only part of a far broader phased process involving deep cuts in armed forces and conventional arms and the modification of their structure on the basis of non-offensive defence, as well as the establishment of machinery to ensure openness and monitoring, not only to guarantee the implementation of disarmament through all the facets of this process, but also to create a relaxed atmosphere in relations between States. And, lastly, radical changes in East-West relations generally, the progressive replacement of instruments for maintaining peace by military force by security guarantees in the political, economic, humanitarian and environmental fields and their enshrinement in appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements. Such an approach will require us to progressively overcome the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, an organic component of the system of international security which was established after the Second World War, and which we want to rid outselves of within the foreseeable future.

Today, as never before, this doctrine deserves detailed, impartial consideration. On the one hand, it is impregnated with the concept of the ennemy, the idea of mutual intimidation and competition in stockpiling nuclear weapons. It somehow absorbs into itself - or rather into the instruments of its implementation - all the weight of the stereotypes of mutual mistrust, suspicion, animosity and false, often grotesque perceptions about each other, which were built up during the long years of the "cold war". On the other hand, as long as these stereotypes and perceptions are not overcome, the doctrine of deterrence gives some countries a sense of security. Perhaps it is a misleading feeling similar to being under the influence of drugs. But it would be rash to deprive people of a sense of security, even if the security is imaginary, without giving them something in exchange. Finally, one must recognize that sometimes we were guilty of a simplistic approach to this doctrine and turned a blind eye to the fact that, in a given historical context, this doctrine did play a useful role in maintaining peace. To put it in a nutshell, I think it would be impossible to overcome this psychological barrier in a single leap and do away with nuclear weapons, as some suggest, unless humanity can see that the world it is entering will be more secure than the one it is leaving behind. In the present conditions building a nuclear-free world certainly cannot be understood as a simple return to the pre-nuclear world with all its problems, contradictions and threats. In this context the achievement of a level of "minimal deterrence" seems for the moment to be a realistic stage on the way to a nuclear-free world. This will lead to the elimination of the most dangerous dimensions of the doctrine of deterrence while maintaining the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons themselves. The first steps in this direction have been taken. These include not only the Soviet-American Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but also the achievements in the elimination and reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

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One of the main results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Washington is that it created conditions for finalizing the treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. Almost no one, it seems, now harbours any doubt that the treaty will be signed by the end of the year. After that it will be discussed in the highest legislative bodies of the two countries. At the same time the treaty on strategic offensive weapons is already attracting great attention, and its agreed provisions are being carefully analysed. Indeed, it is already drawing criticism. Yet despite all the differences in the assessment of the treaty, almost nobody now questions the view that it will become an important milestone, both in the history of arms control and in relations between the USSR and the United States. Of course, there have been earlier periods in Soviet-American relations when important bilateral agreements in the military and strategic field were signed. But they resulted only in the containment of the arms race in specific areas, and some limitation of the military rivalry between the USSR and the United States. It is a fact that the 1960s saw a rapid build-up of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, while the 1970s and 1980s saw even more rapid growth in the aggregate number of warheads as a result of the installation of multiple independently targetted warheads on these missiles. That growth was not halted either by the interim agreement on SALT I (1972), nor by the SALT II treaty (1979) - which of course does not diminish the unquestionable value of these agreements.

Should a Soviet-American treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms be concluded, for the first time in the history of the development of the strategic triad the steady build-up of all its three components will be halted and, over a seven-year period, both the number of strategic delivery vehicles of nuclear warheads (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and the number of nuclear warheads will be reduced. That would mark the beginning of a process of real reduction of strategic arms, an extremely substantial reduction measured in hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of warheads. Even more importantly, these reductions will be designed to make a first strike less likely. That will result in increased stability and a lessened threat of war.

It should be pointed out that with the beginning of the START negotiations substantial changes took place in the military programmes of the USSR and the United States, moving towards a reduction in the quantity of the arms concerned deployed and the postponement of the move to new arms systems. The number of new military programmes has also plummeted. The draft treaty provides for substantial quantitative and qualitative limitations to be imposed on the modernization of strategic offensive arms. For instance, limitations are fixed for the aggregate throw weight of ballistic missiles and the maximum number of warheads on these missiles; new types of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs and new types of ballistic missile launchers are banned; and ALCMs with multiple independently targetable warheads are banned. Many other limitations and bans are also provided for. Overall it can be said that for its own purposes the draft treaty resolves the problem of limiting the modernization of strategic offensive arms.

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Although the treaty on strategic offensive arms will not contain a direct limitation on sea-launched cruise missiles, each side will provide the other with a unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCMs, and subsequently, each year for the entire duration of the treaty, will provide unilateral declarations regarding its plans for deployment of nuclear long-range SLCMs, i.e. those with a range in excess of 600 kilometres. These declarations will be politically binding. The annual declarations will specify the years in which the treaty is in force, with the condition that the number declared must not exceed 880 units. The reductions and limitations spelt out in the treaty will be accompanied by far-reaching verification measures, including the conduct of 12 kinds of on-site inspection on a basis of reciprocity, the use of national technical means of verification, with a ban on interference with them and on denial of access of telemetric information, and the regular exchange of data on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of strategic offensive arms. In order to promote achievement of the aims of the treaty, the sides will set up a joint compliance and inspection commission.

We understand that the parties' strategic armaments structures which will remain in place after reductions under the treaty may not fully correspond with the views of the two sides as to strategic stability. However, we view this as an additional argument in favour of an immediate start to negotiations on the next stage of reductions in strategic offensive arms once the treaty being prepared has been concluded.

The determination of the USSR and the United States, as recorded in the special joint statement signed during the Washington summit, to hold consultations without delay after treaty signature regarding future talks on nuclear and space arms and on the further strengthening of strategic stability, and to begin these negotiations at the earliest practical date, is of course of no less importance than the treaty itself. Indeed, a balanced and objective assessment of the treaty can be provided only within the broad context of the intention of the two countries, explicitly stated at the Washington summit, to take further steps towards nuclear disarmament, for which the treaty provides the necessary pre-conditions.

According to the joint statement on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and further enhancing strategic stability, the USSR and the United States have agreed to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Their objectives are to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries. In these new negotiations emphasis will be placed on removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving priority to highly survivable systems.

In evaluating the significance of the future treaty on strategic offensive arms it is also important to keep in mind that without one the USSR and the United States could have more than twice as many IBMs and SLBMs and

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could considerably increase the number of heavy bombers armed with nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs. Nor would there be any limitations on the planned deployment of nuclear SLCMs. In the context of such a large-scale approach to strategic arms reductions, strategic stability becomes considerably more sensitive to non-strategic nuclear arms, both land-based and sea-launched.

The elimination of imbalances and asymmetries in conventional armed forces in Europe under the treaty being negotiated in Vienna would open up a realistic prospect for fairly radical reductions in land-based tactical nuclear weapons to the level of "minimal deterrence". What that level will be remains to be determined in the course of negotiations. It is clear, though, that when reduced to that level the capabilities of the sides should be limited to the deterrent function and should not create the perception on the part of the other side that they may be used in a first strike, including their use for the purpose of initiating hostilities involving conventional forces. I would like to remind the distinguished participants in the Conference that in that direction as well we have already begun to move unilaterally. In 1989 500 nuclear warheads were withdrawn from the territories of our allies - 166 aviation warheads, 50 artillery warheads and 284 missile warheads. In the past two years we have not modernized our tactical nuclear missiles by means of replacement or by other means.

In order to create a favourable climate for negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons which the Soviet Union proposes to begin as early as this autumn, we have decided to reduce our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe further. Specifically: by the end of this year in Central Europe, the USSR will cut 60 launchers of tactical missiles, i.e. missiles with a shorter range than those being eliminated under the INF Treaty. In the Soviet Union these missiles include the "R-17" or "Scud-B" (300 kilometres), the "Tochka" or "SS-21" (70 kilometres) and the "Luna" or "Frog" (70 kilometres). Moreover, in Central Europe over 250 pieces of nuclear-capable artillary will be cut. These include heavy artillary of 152 mm calibre and above. Finally, 1,500 nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from that zone. This includes nuclear warheads from missiles subject to reductions, nuclear artillary shells and gravity bombs. However, the USSR is not limiting the sphere of its unilateral reductions to Central Europe only. In the European region the USSR will cut a total of 140 tactical missile launchers and 3,200 nuclear-capable artillary pieces by the end of this year.

We are taking these steps unilaterally without making them subject to any pre-conditions, although we believe that they create favourable conditions for the forthcoming negotations on tactical nuclear weapons. We also note certain steps with regard to the removal of tactical nuclear warheads from the European continent taken by NATO in recent years, and we view positively President G. Bush's decision to abandon the "Lance" programme and cancel any further modernization of munitions for United States nuclear artillary deployed in Europe. We would still prefer a decision on the complete elimination of both short-range missiles and all other categories of tactical nuclear weapons, including their nuclear components. However, if NATO

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countries are not ready for such a radical solution to the issue at the present time, we could also consider the possibility of an intermediate stage, that is, an asymmetric reduction to the lowest possible level.

The limitation and reduction of sea-based nuclear weapons constitute a significant problem directly related to the task of ensuring a level of "minimum nuclear deterrence". Unless that problem is resolved, efforts in other areas of nuclear disarmament are likely to be devalued, since broad prospects will open up for an intensive rechannelling of military rivalry to that area of the nuclear arms race, outflanking future agreements. In this respect we note the comprehensive statements made on this topic in our Conference by the distinguished representative of Sweden, the Chairman of the Disarmanent Commission, Ambassador M.B. Theorin of Sweden, and the distinguished representative of Finland, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs A. Karhilo, as well as the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán.

We have proposed to the United States a start on negotations on the phased reduction and elimination of sea-based nuclear weapons (this means not just SLBMs); the elimination of all nuclear weapons on surface ships could be dealt with in the first phase of these talks. Moreover, the talks should produce a definite solution to the problem of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, which should also be eliminated. This could of course lead to the establishment of "minimal nuclear deterrence" at sea.

As applied to land-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, the concept of "minimal deterrence" is of course a relative one, and can be viewed as merely an intermediate phase on the path to complete elimination of such weapons. After all, minimal deterrence, in all probability, implies at the same time as high a "nuclear" threshold as possible, whereas in objective terms this threshold will become lower as non-strategic nuclear weapons are introduced into the parties' nuclear arsenals.

Returning to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, you will probably also recall that it emerged in specific historical circumstances and in a specific regional context. The ground is now being prepared for the establishment of new conditions in this region which should enable everyone to take a new look at the role of nuclear weapons as well. It took four decades of confrontation, several crises, every one of which might have been the last one, an irretrievable waste of enormous resources and finally the realization of the necessity to build relations between States on a qualitatively new basis, to make it possible for such a statement to be made. And it would be a very grave mistake if the theory of nuclear deterrence or a theory of deterrence based on other types of weapons of mass destruction, began to gain force and to materialize in other regions of the world as well.

A serious cause of the continuing threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons lies not in the fact that the efforts of the USSR and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament are allegedly insufficiently effective as yet, but rather in a growing potential for instability and a high

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concentration of non-nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. In this respect the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an integrated problem and is linked with the search for solutions to other regional disarmament issues (in particular, non-proliferation of chemical weapons, missiles and missile technology, limitations on the arms trade, etc.), as well as the reduction of tension in zones of potential conflict and crisis situations. At the summit meeting the USSR and the United States adopted a comprehensive statement setting out specific avenues for interaction between them in various of these areas, as well as for co-operation with other countries. It reflects a common recognition of the fact that the accelerating process of arms reduction must be strengthened with measures aimed at countering the spread of weapons throughout the world. The USSR and the United States have also made substantial efforts to settle regional conflicts.

Where nuclear disarmament issues are concerned, our forum, that is to say the Conference on Disarmament, has so far been left out of the picture. In dealing with actual multilateral nuclear disarmament, the Conference is undoubtedly the very place where negotiations should be held. But three nuclear States say that pending the emergence of certain conditions, they are not prepared to join in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This does not mean that conceptual work must not be pursued, let us say at the same informal meetings of ours. In this respect I would also like to draw attention to a particular nuclear disarmament issue, the prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In essence, such a ban would be the most radical and the shortest path to the elimination of nuclear weapons, for in the mean time the destruction of launchers alone is being negotiated, and warheads remain in States' arsenals. Therefore, strictly speaking, mankind has not yet embarked on nuclear disarmament proper, and this is a matter for justified concern on the part of the world community. The cessation of the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium would inevitably lead to cuts in the actual industrial base for making key components of nuclear weapons. We believe that an objectively favourable situation now exists for the solution of this issue: in the United States the production of weapons-grade plutonium has virtually stopped; in the Soviet Union the production of weapons-grade uranium was halted in 1989, three reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium have been shut down and a programme has been adopted to decommission all plutonium reactors of this type by the year 2000. Hence we may certainly raise the point here that in these circumstances the Conference could start practical consideration of the monitored cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes - under effective control, of course.

If we were to look for the most glaring example of the international community's impotence to solve the tasks it has set itself within a few decades, the problem of nuclear tests would be among the major candidates. The fact that the Conference has failed to take action in this regard undermines its authority. At the same time it is obvious that a test ban is not only a measure to curb the nuclear arms race but a very important means of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The time has truly come,

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we believe, to establish an ad hoc committee on this issue, which could set to work, and the sooner the better. The Czechoslovak proposal for a mandate for this committee might provide a basis, and this has been recognized by all. Essentially, the discussion is about words. Maybe it would be better to stop this dispute and agree to accept the draft mandate as it is? It is a suggestion based on compromise, which emerged after long disputes and discussions. In this connection, I should like to reaffirm once again my delegation's support for the efforts being undertaken by the distinguished Ambassador Donowaki in this direction. We see no contradiction between the Conference's starting work on the testing issue, which will inevitably be of a step-by-step nature, and the step-by-step approach which the USSR and the United States agreed upon as a basis for negotiations on nuclear testing, although the stage-by-stage approach may of course take different concrete forms.

Protocols to the Soviet-American threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 have been signed, and this means that the first aim of the bilateral Soviet-American talks has been achieved. In accordance with the existing agreement, we support the continuation of these bilateral negotiations for the purpose of considering further limitations on the number and yield of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has suggested resuming them in September, and we expect a positive reply from the American side.

Literally a few words on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Space technology is one of the most rapidly developing fields. It is directly related to security and stability. We do not know exactly what kind of space technology we will have to deal with in 10 or 15 years' time, in particular that which may be of military significance, although we do know about the research being conducted in this field. To see that the Conference on Disarmament has been going round in circles on space issues for many years gives rise to gloomy thoughts. Like many other members of the Conference, the Soviet Union has introduced a number of proposals for radical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space - measures of a prohibitory nature aimed at preventing the development and deployment either of any space weapons at all, or of specific types of weapon, such as anti-satellite weapons. However, experience shows that such radical measures cannot become the subject of concrete negotiations in the near future. As a result, more and more delegations are opting to begin with confidence-building measures in space. We believe that this is right. The idea here is not to start negotiations just for the sake of negotiations, in order to be able to report that we are conducting negotiations on outer space, but rather to take the first steps towards establishing the basis for confidence with respect to States' space activities - if you will, to build up experience with constructive multilateral work as regards the outer space dimension of security and stability. However important the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations are, multilateral efforts are vital here, because an increasing number of States are becoming involved in space activities. Therefore, we suggest that the concept of "open outer space" should become a subject of consideration at the Conference on Disarmament. The most important measures related to the realization of the "open outer space" concept, in our view, include (a) the

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strengthening of the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; (b) the elaboration of "rules of the road" or a "code of conduct"; (c) the use of space-based monitoring devices in the interest of the international community; and (d) the establishment of an international space inspectorate. France's proposal for the establishment of an international centre to process images obtained from space also deserves a positive response. These measures cannot endanger anybody's security, and we urge all States to study thoroughly the positive potential embodied in the "open outer space" concept.

In conclusion, a few words on chemical weapons. It is generally recognized that in present circumstances the most promising direction in the work of the Conference is the drawing up of a convention on this subject. Great importance is attached to the Soviet-American agreement on chemical weapons in this regard. The USSR and the United States are to begin to implement its major provisions without waiting for the convention to be concluded. The obligation not to produce chemical weapons is of special importance, in our view, within the context of this bilateral agreement. Indeed, it is a corner-stone of the future multilateral convention. And the fact that the USSR and the United States have agreed to assume such an obligation without waiting for the convention to be completed is, in our view, convincing evidence of the readiness of the parties to the bilateral agreement to work for the early conclusion of the multilateral convention. For the USSR, this also means that its unilateral decision to stop production of chemical weapons (and this was done in 1987) will be formalized as an international treaty, thus settling unequivocally and irrevocably the question of whether Soviet society will devote new resources to the production of chemical weapons.

The bilateral agreement provides that, at the multilateral negotiations, the USSR and the United States will introduce a proposal to hold a special conference at the end of the eighth year after the convention enters into force, to decide by a majority vote whether the participation in the convention is sufficient for the final destruction of chemical weapons. The joint statement contains details of this proposal. In this connection, I would like, not just on behalf of my delegation, but also on behalf of the United States delegation, to draw the attention of the distinguished delegates to a working paper in the CD/CW/WP.... series, but I think without a number as yet - this is an advance copy which is before you. Both our delegations plan to dwell in greater detail thereon in due course and in the appropriate context, and this step has been undertaken in pursuance of the bilateral agreement signed on 1 June in Washington.

Now turning back to my own statement, I would like to stress that here we have a compromise proposal that takes into account both elements of the United States proposal known as the "2 per cent" proposal, and the criticism of that initial American proposal by the USSR and a number of other participants in the negotiations. Both the need to evaluate participation in the convention by States which are important from the point of view of its

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effectiveness, and the importance of avoiding incentives to acquire chemical weapons, are taken into account. Moreover, this proposal stimulates States possessing chemical weapons to become original parties to the convention.

Finally, with all due respect to those who have criticized this proposal, I would like to say that I do not in any way share their perception of attempts to impose some sort of Soviet-American diktat, or a wish on the part of the two countries to force their decisions upon other participants in the negotiations. The bilateral agreement clearly states that the two sides have agreed to introduce the proposal - and I stress, the proposal - at the Conference on Disarmament. And this, of course, is the legitimate right of every participant in the negotiations. For our part, we are satisfied with this joint approach and we will champion its advantages in our future work. At the same time, we consider it essential to step up efforts to solve the problem of the universality of the future convention.

In this connection, I should like to return to the statement adopted by the NATO foreign ministers at Turnberry, and specifically the passage in which the members of the North Atlantic bloc state their intention to be among the first to sign the future convention. We welcome that declaration. Of course we also welcome the even more far-reaching statements made here by Sweden and Finland concerning their readiness to become original participants. We have great hopes that during the summer session of the Conference, the multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons will acquire new dynamism, which, unfortunately, they have sometimes been lacking in recent times. Strictly speaking, not much remains to be done, and it is important to lay a solid foundation within the remaining time to solve all outstanding issues, first and foremost those concerning definitions and challenge inspections, ad hoc inspections, assistance to victims of CW use, etc.

In its statement today, the Soviet delegation has shared its views with you on a number of key aspects of the problem of disarmament and the role the Conference on Disarmament could play in finding solutions. I think that one of the significant phenomena of our work today is the fact that this Conference is turning its eyes on itself. We have begun to look collectively for our place in a rapidly changing world. We plan to dwell on this subject and some other issues pertaining to the work of the Conference in the near future.

MR BAYART (Mongolia): first of all, Mr President, I wish to congratulate you on the effective and skilful manner in which you have conducted the work of the Conference on Disarmament during the month of June. I also wish to thank Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, of Pakistan, for his excellent work as President of the Conference in April. This is the last opportunity for me to address the Conference on Disarmament before relinquishing my post as the head of the Mongolian delegation. Allow me to say a few words of a somewhat personal nature.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

During the years of my service here in Geneva, historic changes have taken place in international relations. A model of international security is being forged through collective efforts. Democratization of international relations is taking shape. These changes are profound in nature and open new, brighter horizons for disarmament negotiations. Important landmark agreements have been concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States. The verification issue, which has long been the stumbling-block on the road to disarmament, proved to be solvable, given political will, a spirit of compromise and co-operation.

I hope that the latest agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons will serve as a catalyst in our common endeavour to achieve the early conclusion of a global convention. I also believe that the future convention on the banning of chemical weapons is a unique one with its innovative approach to a number of traditionally extremely difficult problems. I am confident that the carefully crafted procedures on verification and implementation will serve as a model for future multilateral disarmament agreements.

It is a pleasure for me to announce that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has decided to withdraw the reservation it made on the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. In our view such a step constitutes an important measure to strengthen the prohibition régime envisaged in the Protocol.

The Mongolian Government welcomes the joint statement of the USSR and the United States concerning the treaty on strategic offensive arms. The START treaty, which is expected to be ready for signing by the end of the year, should become an important milestone in the disarmament negotiations of recent years. By cutting the strategic offensive arms of the two Powers almost in half, this treaty would make an important contribution to international peace and enhance stability.

I am returning to my country at a time of sweeping changes. The process of restructuring and renovation in Mongolia has accelerated. Undoubtedly political developments during the first half of this year will have a profound impact on the future of my country. The main goal of the radical changes that Mongolia is undergoing is, in short, the attainment of genuine democracy. The Government is directing the thrust of its policy to the human and social dimensions of development. The restructuring embraces all spheres of the country's social and political life, including its foreign policy. The Mongolian Government has consistently pursued the policy of developing and strengthening its relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence, mutually beneficial co-operation and respect for the right of peoples to choose their own path of development, and it remains faithful to those principles. The Government of Mongolia has adopted non-alignment as one of the basic principles of its foreign policy. My Government will continue to

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pursue its policy of keeping Mongolia free of nuclear weapons; it will not station on the territory of Mongolia foreign troops or armed forces directed against a third country; it continues to promote and strengthen mutual confidence with neighbouring and all other countries. On the basis of these principles Mongolia will seek to guarantee its security by political means. My country will continue its active participation in the work of the United Nations and other international organizations, and will promote the solution of global problems such as disarmament, environmental protection, the establishment of a new economic order, etc.

I have been in Geneva for more than five years. For me personally they have been fascinating and highly rewarding. I shall always cherish the fond memories of my personal friendships, official contacts and co-operation with my colleagues. I have tried my best to benefit and learn from them. I have always admired and respected my colleagues' deep knowledge of disarmament problems and diplomatic skill in conducting negotiations. In my diplomatic career I have been associated with the Conference on Disarmament for more than 10 years. I share the view that the Conference on Disarmament has inherited too much from the past, such as its agenda, its decision-making process and the organization of its work. It is evident that the Conference on Disarmament should take steps to adjust itself to the present reality. This is a process that will require serious negotiations and can be realized gradually. I firmly believe in the Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and I am sure that the collective efforts and political wisdom of its members will find the right solution to the important question of the improved and effective functioning of the CD. And, in the light of the improved international climate, I have every reason to be optimistic and expect that the time will come soon when constructive and productive negotiations will commence on a number of priority issues, in particular the comprehensive nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

In conclusion, I wish to thank most sincerely Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Ambassador Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, for the unfailing support and co-operation they have given me during my assignment here, especially at the time when I had the honour to serve the CD as its President in July of last year, and when I chaired the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1986 and 1989. I also wish to thank the able and efficient staff of the disarmament secretariat and all those whom we do not see in this Council chamber but whose dedication and high professional performance keep the CD running so smoothly. With sadness in my heart I say goodbye to you all. I wish you and the Conference on Disarmament every success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia for his statement, as well as for the kind words he addressed to me. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf I wish to convey to Ambassador and Mrs. Bayart our best wishes for personal happiness and professional success in their country. Ambassador Bayart, as we are all

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aware, has represented his country effectively, skilfully and honourably, not to mention his well-known gifts as a linguist. During his activities in this Conference he made an outstanding contribution to our work as President, and on two occasions he also chaired the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. On both occasions Ambassador Bayart, who is leaving us as deputy dean of the representatives in the Conference, served with his usual skill. We wish you every personal good fortune, Ambassador Bayart.

I have no other speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I would suggest that we take up our timetable of meetings for next week. The secretariat circulated this timetable today. As usual, it was prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. As you will see from the text, open-ended consultations on the question of the improved and more effective functioning of the Conference will take place on Tuesday 3 July instead of Thursday 5 July. That date has been given to the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 5. As always, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed if necessary. If there are no objections, may I take it that the Conference adopts the timetable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I would like now to turn to the closing date for the 1990 session of the Conference. I wish to inform you that as a result of the consultations which have taken place over the past few days, there seems to be agreement on concluding our work on Friday 24 August. This is on the clear understanding that the plenary meeting that is scheduled for Thursday 23 August will be put off to the next day at 4.30 p.m. May I take it that there are no objections to the date proposed?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I would now like to make my closing statement as President from Peru for the month of June 1990.

As this is the last plenary meeting at which I will serve as President on behalf of Peru, I wish to share with you some thoughts in my capacity as outgoing President. First of all, I should note that the work of the second part of the 1990 session began in good time in keeping with the tradition of the Conference on Disarmament, and that includes the activities of subsidiary bodies. The programme of work for the second half of the session was adopted and, after successful consultations, we reached the hoped-for consensus on the date for the closing of the 1990 session - that is, we will conclude our work on 24 August next. We have had six plenary meetings including this one. In the six meetings we have had less than 10 speakers, and I must confess that sometimes I felt somewhat lonely in plenary. But at all events I am pleased that I managed to keep the Conference going in an exceptionally competitive atmosphere in Geneva, a period rich in attractions such as the visit to Munster and the meetings on non-proliferation, including the one organized by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan on behalf of the Bellerive group, which had great drawing power.

(The President)

During these 17 days in which I served as President, I had a particularly close view of Ambassador Donowaki's efforts to finalize the establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. While I have taken an impartial position as President, and that will always be the case, I cannot remain neutral in the face of the delay in establishing an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban in this Conference. The setting up of such a committee is indispensable, and this must take place in the immediate future if there is to be symmetry in the work of this Conference. By that I mean that the intensive work that has been done in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons must also be balanced by similar efforts in dealing with the nuclear issues, particularly the question of the nuclear test ban, and also within an ad hoc committee. I am sure that the establishment of such an ad hoc committee will in the future strengthen the legitimacy of the Conference on Disarmament in promoting discussions on the nuclear test ban at a time when we are witnessing new and positive trends in nuclear and conventional disarmament and arms control, and, above all - I wish to stress this point - it would in the future prevent bitter discussions at the forthcoming conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Inflexibility in respect of setting up an ad hoc committee on item 1 would, I sincerely believe, create an unnecessary atmosphere of confrontation within the positive climate that now exists for the holding of the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I hope that common sense and a spirit of compromise will finally prevail, and that in the first week or two of July my successor Ambassador Sujka of Poland will be able to announce the setting up of the ad hoc committee which has been called for on so many occasions.

On Items 2 and 3 of our agenda, informal plenary meetings have been resumed to discuss elements of substance relating to two issues of the greatest interest. In this respect we would express a wish that, as requested by the Group of 21 in the first half of this year, the START negotiators will in the near future participate in these informal meetings so as to inform this Conference, off the record, of details of the START negotiations after the Washington summit.

On 14 and 15 June, at the kind invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, almost all the representatives accredited to the Conference on Disarmament visited the training and research centre at Munster, enabling us to acquaint ourselves on the spot with the various aspects and stages of the process of detection and destruction of chemical weapons, as well as the practical application of some verification methods. On behalf of my delegation and the Conference I wish to request Ambassador von Wagner to convey to his Government our gratitude for its kind hospitality and the excellent organization of that most useful visit.

As you know, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has also resumed its work under the capable guidance of Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden. With respect to this item I should mention in particular the meeting

(The President)

taking place currently with representatives of the chemical industry which is due to end tomorrow and which, I think, will be very useful in ascertaining the views of the private sector on the various aspects of the draft convention, for example the question of confidentiality.

Another subject which should be highlighted in these first few weeks of this second part of the 1990 session concerns the beginning of informal consultations on the question of the improved functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, under the chairmanship of my good friend and colleague, Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan. This is a major first step, the outcome of the clearly expressed wish and determination of all the members of this Conference, and it should therefore be followed by other steps to finalize gradually the agreements reached starting in 1991.

I think it is a positive sign of convergence that the programme of consultations submitted by Ambassador Kamal for our consideration has been accepted without objections. Thus in the first working session there was extensive analysis and exchange of ideas on various positions concerning expansion of the membership of the Conference. Interesting initiatives emerged which could serve as a basis for exploring new models or formulae that would lead us to a solution allowing for expansion, as all wish.

Last but not least, I am pleased to transfer the presidency of this Conference to the experienced hands of Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, who will be succeeding me. I wish him every success as he carries out his duties. I wish to thank the secretariat for its important and ongoing work in support of the President. In particular I wish to express my appreciation to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and to Ambassador Berasategui.

I see there is no other business, and I shall therefore proceed to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday 3 July at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.